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Abstract
This paper develops a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model to explain
variance decompositions of real exchange rates. Its key features are trade costs, het-
erogeneous productivity and sticky wages. Dynamics of comparative advantage amplify
the expenditure switching. The model predicts that importance of the relative price of
traded goods is increasing in the covariance between terms of trade and productivity
diﬀerentials in the non-traded and export sectors. Given interest rate shocks, exchange
rate stability reduces the covariance and importance of the relative price of the traded
goods. Total factor productivity shocks raise the covariance and cause the relative
price of traded goods to drive real exchange rates, regardless of exchange rate regimes.
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The empirical literature on real exchange rate (RER) volatility has found that some RERs are
driven by the relative price of traded goods (traded RER) and some by the relative, relative
price of non-traded to traded goods (non-traded RER).1 The question of which relative
price dominates RER has important implications for international shock transmissions. The
theoretical literature has proposed the following determinants: price stickiness and invoice
currency, pricing to market, trade costs, and endogenous tradability.
This paper presents an alternative theory with an emphasis on endogenous tradability and
exchange rate regimes. The role of exchange rate regimes was ﬁrst documented by Mendoza
(2000). He ﬁnds that the contribution of non-traded RERs to the variance of Mexico-U.S.
RERs is over 30 percent higher in the period of ﬁxed than the period of ﬂexible exchange
rates. He also ﬁnds that the correlation between traded and non-traded RERs is negative
under the period of ﬁxed but positive under the period of ﬂexible exchange rates. Recently,
Burstein et al. (2005) ﬁnd that RERs after devaluations closely track the non-traded RERs.
Before describing the model, I conﬁrm both Mendoza’s (2000) and Burstein et al.’s (2005)
ﬁndings using RERs of European and emerging economies. Although the contribution of the
non-traded RER is quite high after some currency crises, it is still lower than it was before
devaluations by 31 percent on average. I also document a similar pattern in a cross-section
of 595 RERs. The country pairs of which the RER is relatively quite inﬂuenced by the
non-traded RER have relatively stable nominal exchange rates.
My main contribution is a stochastic general equilibrium model explaining these stylized
1Engel (1999) ﬁnds that the U.S. RERs are driven by the traded RER. His ﬁnding is supported by Chari
et al. (2002) and Betts and Kehoe (2001a). Mendoza (2000), Betts and Kehoe (2001a) and Burstein et al.
(2005) document importance of the non-traded RER.
1facts. Its key features are heterogeneous productivity, trade costs and sticky wages. The
specialization pattern follows comparative advantage as in Dornbusch et al. (1977) and
some goods are not traded. Aggregate shocks create dynamics of comparative advantage
and cause ﬁrms to transit into or out of exporting. These transitions generate asymmetry
in aggregate productivity variations across sectors and amplify the expenditure switching.
In particular, productivity variations in the non-traded sector are positively correlated with
but larger than those in the export sector, because ﬁrms in the non-traded sector are subject
to both domestic and foreign competition.
I analytically show that, given a condition, the contribution of the traded RER is increas-
ing in the covariance between terms of trade and productivity diﬀerentials in the non-traded
and export sectors. A large covariance implies that wage inﬂation is oﬀset by productivity
gain more in the non-traded than in the export sector. The covariance measures the degree
to which shocks are transmitted to prices in the export sector relative to those in the non-
traded sector. The diﬀerence in the covariance across exchange rate regimes is essentially
the expenditure switching eﬀect of exchange rates generated by endogenous tradability.
To highlight the importance of endogenous tradability, I analytically show that the cor-
relation between traded and non-traded RERs is perfect in the absence of endogenous trad-
ability. The perfect correlation results from the fact that shocks are transmitted to both
RERs only through terms of trade when the trade pattern is exogenous. However, Engel
(1999) and Mendoza (2000) ﬁnd that the correlation in the data is not perfect. Hence, my
model oﬀers a better explanation for the observed correlation than the existing framework.
In the quantitative part, I calibrate the model under ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rate
regimes, to match the behaviors of RERs before and after devaluations in the data. Given
2interest rate shocks, exchange rate stability reduces the covariance and raises the contribu-
tion of the non-traded RER by 31 percent, as observed in the data. The predicted correlation
between traded and non-traded RERs is positive when exchange rate is ﬂexible but negative
when exchange rate is ﬁxed, as found by Mendoza (2000). Consistent with Mussa (1986)
and Stockman (1989), exchange rate stability substantially reduces the overall RER volatil-
ity. The RER volatility under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime is much larger than output
volatility, in line with the exchange rate disconnect puzzle in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000b).
However, shocks on total factor productivity (TFP) do not create signiﬁcant diﬀerences
across regimes, and the contribution of the traded RER exceeds 50 percent. Favorable TFP
shocks prevent high-cost exporters from exiting and reduce the average productivity, besides
reducing terms of trade as in standard models. Given that productivity variations are larger
in the non-traded than the export sector, TFP shocks produce positive covariations between
terms of trade and productivity diﬀerentials. My model suggests that TFP shocks could
explain why the U.S. RERs are driven by the traded RER in Engel (1999).
Besides the mechanism in my model, exchange rate stability reduces volatility of the
traded RER when exporters practice local currency pricing, as in Devereux and Engel (2002).
My model should be viewed as complementary to local currency pricing, since its evidence
is limited to developed countries.2 On the other hand, the evidence for transitions in and
out of exporting applies to both developed and developing countries.3
My study is related to recent work on endogenous tradability. In Betts and Kehoe
(2001b) and Bergin and Glick (2003), trade pattern depends on heterogeneity of trade costs,
and asymmetry in price variations arises from variations of aggregate trade costs. My work
2See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and Campa and Goldberg (2005).
3See Aitken et al. (1997), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Besedes and Prusa (2003) and Das et al. (2001).
3is more similar to Ghironi and Melitz (2005), in which asymmetric price variations also
arise from productivity variations. These models are isomorphic in producing asymmetric
price variations, and predict that the traded-RER drives RER in response to TFP shocks.
My innovation is showing that nominal shocks raise the importance of the non-traded RER
when exchange rate is ﬁxed. My model implies that the assumption that the relative price
of non-traded to traded goods drives RER, such as in Calvo (1986), is useful for studying
stabilization policy in the wake of nominal shocks. However, deviations from the law of one
price for traded goods are necessary for studying the eﬀects of real shocks. Moreover, my
study is the ﬁrst one that shows that endogenous tradability is essential for generating the
observed correlation between traded and non-traded RERs.
I present the stylized facts in the next section. The model is developed in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the calibration results. I conclude the study in Section 5.
2 Stylized facts and related literature






where St is nominal exchange rate and Pt is the consumer price index (CPI). The superscript
  denotes the foreign variables. Let Pt,T be the traded-goods price index. Deﬁne the traded
RER as the relative price of traded-goods baskets, Qt,T = StP  
t,T/Pt,T. The non-traded RER
is the residual Qt,N = Qt/Qt,T, as in Engel (1999) and Chari et al. (2002).
The log of RERs are ﬁltered with the Baxter-King ﬁlter with 12 leads and lags, passing
the cyclical components lasting from 6 to 32 quarters. Let lowercases denote the detrended
series. We can decompose the RER variance as σ2(qt)=σ2(qt,T)+σ2(qt,N)+2 σ(qt,T,q t,N),
4where σ denotes standard deviation or covariance. Deﬁne the contribution of the traded




,i ∈ (T,N)( 1 )
vi may take negative values, since the covariance term is negative by construction.
First, I focus on the variance decomposition around the following currency crises: Brazil
in 1999, Finland in 1992, Korea in 1997, Indonesia in 1997, Mexico in 1994, Philippines in
1997, Sweden in 1992, Thailand in 1997 and United Kingdom in 1992. I deﬁne the RERs of
Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom against Germany, and the rest against the U.S.
I construct quarterly RERs from various databases. Exchange rate series are from the
World Currency Report provided by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) and International Financial
Statistics (IFS). The Report has an advantage, since it tracks market rates while the IFS
only records oﬃcial rates. However, the IFS covers a longer period. I use two measures
of traded-goods prices: producer price index (PPI) and a geometric average of import and
export unit values (UV). Both series are from the IFS and have diﬀerent drawbacks. The PPI
is partly inﬂuenced by prices of local inputs, creating a downward bias in the contribution
of the non-traded RER. However, it is available in a large sample. On the other hand, the
UV series proxy prices of actual traded goods but we have no data on the expenditure share
of imports and exports. I assume that the share is 0.5 each. These series produce 4 diﬀerent
datasets. Dataset 1 uses market exchange rates and PPI. Dataset 2 uses market exchange
rates and UV. Dataset 3 uses oﬃcial exchange rates and PPI. Dataset 4 uses oﬃcial exchange
rates and UV. The number of crises in each datasets is 3, 3, 9 and 6, respectively.
I decompose the RER variance over the course of 12 quarters before and after devalua-
5tions. Figure 1 plots the contributions of non-traded RERs after devaluations against those
before devaluations. Letters indicate ﬁrst initials of country names. The numbers index the
dataset. Figure 1 presents two facts. First, almost all observations lie below the 45-degree
line, meaning that the contributions of non-traded RERs fall following devaluations. The
contribution rises following only two crises: Philippines and Thailand both in 1997. On aver-
age, the contribution before and after devaluations is 50 percent and 19 percent, respectively.
The 31-percent diﬀerence is in the range in Mendoza (2000), which is from 30 to 70 percent.
He uses disaggregated price series to decompose the variance of Mexico-U.S. RERs. The
Mexico-U.S. RER in my dataset, however, is only marginally inﬂuenced by devaluations.
The other fact is that the use of UV in Datasets 2 and 4 results in higher contributions
of non-traded RERs than the use of PPI in Datasets 1 and 3. This contrast is in line
with Burstein et al. (2005), who argue that the UV-based price index is a better measure
of traded-goods prices than the domestic price index. They use a similar UV-based index
and ﬁnd that the non-traded RER plays a more important role than the traded RER after
devaluations. This is also the case for four out of six observations in Dataset 4. However,
they do not compare the periods before and after devaluations. My comparison indicates
that exchange rate ﬂexibility reduces the importance of non-traded RERs.
Next, I expand all datasets to a broad cross-section of countries. Datasets 1 and 3 are
extended to 35 countries and 595 RERs, and Datasets 2 and 4 to 22 countries and 231 RERs.4
Datasets 1 and 2 covers from the ﬁrst quarter of 1980 to the end of 1998. Datasets 3 and 4
covers from the ﬁrst quarter of 1980 to the second quarter of 2005. I compute the standard
deviation of quarterly depreciation as a measure of exchange rate volatility. In Figure 2,
I plot the contribution of the non-traded RER against volatility of market exchange rates.
4Countries in the sample are listed in the appendix.
6Panels A and B use the PPI and the UV, respectively.
Figure 2 summarizes three facts. First, as in Figure 1, the contribution of the non-traded
RER is higher when calculated with the UV index than with the PPI. Also, the observations
with relatively high exchange rate volatility have relatively small contributions by the non-
traded RER. Lastly, the observations with relatively low exchange rate volatility are much
more heterogeneous, and some of them have relatively large contributions of the non-traded
RER. Some RERs are clearly driven by non-traded RERs. The standard deviation of depre-
ciation of the observations with relatively large contributions of the non-traded RER is lower
than 10 percent in both panels. When I switch the exchange rate series to oﬃcial exchange
rates in Figure 3, these patterns remain.
Figures 2 and 3 alone do not relate exchange rate regimes to the variance decomposition,
since exchange rate may be stable even when a ﬂexible exchange rate regime is adopted.
However, Figure 1 strongly suggests the role of exchange rate regimes. It raises an important
question: what mechanism could cause a ﬂexible exchange rate system to suppress the role of
the non-traded RER? Devereux and Engel (2002) propose that local currency pricing reduces
the degree of exchange rate pass-through to import prices and let exchange rate ﬂuctuations
raise volatility of the traded RER. However, the evidence for local currency pricing is limited
to developed countries (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997; Campa and Goldberg, 2005), while my
datasets also include developing countries.
The literature has recently turned to questions that are relevant to both developed and
developing countries. How do goods are classiﬁed as traded or non-traded? Does the compo-
sition of trade respond to shocks? The questions are motivated by the evidence for dynamics
of exporting decision. Aitken et al. (1997) ﬁnd that 10 percent of Mexican manufacturers
7change their export status in 3 years. In Das et al. (2001), the annual rate of entry into
exporting in Columbia is 9 percent, and the exit rate is 7 percent. For the U.S., Bernard and
Jensen (2004) estimate that the entry and the exit rates are 14 and 13 percent, respectively.
Within 3 years 18 percent of non-exporters begin to export and 20 percent of exporters stop.
Also, Besedes and Prusa (2003) ﬁnds the median duration that a country exports a product
to the U.S. ranges from 2 to 4 years.
The evidence suggests that the dynamics of exporting decision are relevant to the dy-
namics of aggregate price and RER. This idea is not new, however. Baldwin (1988) has used
a partial equilibrium model with monopolistic competition to show that sunk costs pro-
duce hysteresis in export and persistent RERs. However, the early studies that incorporate
exporting decision into a general equilibrium analysis take a simpler approach.
Betts and Kehoe (2001b) assume a multi-sector economy with heterogeneous trade costs
in a two-country model. Bergin and Glick (2003) assume heterogeneous trade costs in a small-
open-economy model. In both papers, transitions in and out of exporting in response to TFP
shocks act as another adjustment channel and damp price variations. They quantitatively
show that the mechanism reduces the volatility of the non-traded RER. However, these
models are at odds with trade theory in which demand or supply factors are the prime
determinants of trade. Moreover, there is a limit to discussing interactions between trade
and price in a small open-economy model taking export prices as given.
The ﬁrst study incorporating a rigorous trade theory into a general equilibrium model
is by Ghironi and Melitz (2005). They assume sunk costs, monopolistic competition and
heterogeneous productivity as in Melitz (2003) and Baldwin (1988). Their model generates
low volatility in the non-traded RER and persistent RERs in response to TFP shocks.
8However, similar to the previous studies, it ov e r l o o k st h er o l eo fe x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e s .
3 The model
This section develops a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous trad-
ability. The model adopts the theory of comparative advantage by Dornbusch et al. (1977).
It is simpler than Ghironi and Melitz (2005), but retains the essence that productivity is
crucial for exporting decision. Its other innovation is the introduction of sticky wages so that
the exchange rate is relevant. There are two countries: home and foreign. There exists a
continuum of goods indexed by z,w h e r ez ∈ [0,1]. Residents in the two countries consume
all goods. Although diﬀerences in the composition of consumption can play a role in RER
ﬂuctuations, I abstract from that possibility to focus on the role of composition of trade.
3.1 Firms and specialization pattern
There are a large number of homogeneous ﬁrms taking price as given in each industry z.
Thus, invoice currency is irrelevant. Let the subscript t denote the period. Producer price,
¯ pt(z), is in the seller’s currency. The representative ﬁrm in each industry has the constant-
returns-to-scale technology,
yt(z)=Xtat(z)lt(z). (2)
yt(z) is output. Xt is TFP. at(z) is the industry-speciﬁc productivity. lt(z) is labor input, of
w h i c hu n i tc o s ti sWt. Cost minimization yields marginal-cost pricing.
¯ pt(z)=Wt/(Xtat(z)) (3)
Similar equations apply to the foreign ﬁrms. The superscript   denotes the foreign variables.
To prevent an unrealistically high rate of transitions in and out of exporting, I introduce
9a cost of beginning exporting, denoted by Φt,a(z). It represents additional costs such as
marketing or distribution costs. I model it as an iceberg cost which reduces productivity
a n dd r i v e su pp r i c e ,at(z)=( 1− Φt,a(z))ass(z), where the subscript ss denotes the steady
state. It is increasing in deviations of the steady-state relative productivity of the previously
least-competitive industry from that of the currently least-competitive one. This assumption
ensures that the cost is zero in the steady state. Let us deﬁne the industry-speciﬁc relative
productivity as At(z)=at(z)/a 
t(z), the set of new exporting industries at home as Z
n
t ,
and the set of disappearing exporting industries at home as Zd
t.L e t zl
t and zh
t denote the
endogenously-determined least-competitive industry in each country. Let φa be a parameter

























t ) − 1
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0: otherwise.
International trade is subject to iceberg-type trade costs melting a fraction τ of goods.
Deﬁne relative wage as ωt = Wt/StW  
t , and relative TFP as χt = Xt/X 
t . Dornbusch et al.
(1977) shows that if At(z) is monotonic, ∂At/∂z < 0a n d0<τ<1, then there is a unique
solution for zl
t and zh
t such that 0 <z l
t <z h
t < 1 and the following conditions hold.
At(z
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t characterize the specialization pattern as follows. The home country produces
the goods z ∈ [0,zh
t ] and exports the goods z ∈ [0,zl
t]. The foreign country produces the
goods z ∈ [zl
t,1] and exports the goods z ∈ [zh
t ,1]. Both produce the non-traded goods
z ∈ (zl
t,zh




t = ∅,a n dΦ t,a > 0f o rz ∈ Zn
t . If some home exporters exit, then zl
t <z l
t−1, Zn
t = ∅ and
Φt,a < 0f o rz ∈ Zd
t. Consequently, the entry cost raises the slope of the relative productivity
schedule and productivity of the exporters relative to non-exporters.
I classify goods according to the specialization pattern, from the perspective of the home
economy, into the import, the export and the non-traded sectors. Each is indicated by the
subscript i ∈ (F,H,N). Deﬁne Zt,F =[ zh
t ,1], Zt,H =[ 0 ,zl
t], and Zt,N =( zl
t,zh
t ). The
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t(z)) : z ∈ Zt,F ∪ Zt,N
Wt/(StXtat(z)(1 − τ)) : z ∈ Zt,H
(7)
If τ =0 ,t h e nZt,N = ∅ and pt(z)=Stpt(z) . Clearly, trade costs are crucial in this model
because they create both non-traded goods and deviations from the law of one price.
3.2 Price indices and real exchange rates
There are a large number of wholesalers in each sector i ∈ (F,H,N). The representative














11where δt,F =1− zh
t , δt,H = zl
t,a n dδt,N = zh
t − zl
t. ct(z) is demand for the good z,a n dθ
(θ>1) is the elasticity of substitution. The CES aggregation is often used in the models of
monopolistic competition with diﬀerentiated products. However, the aggregation here takes












There are a large number of retailers who bundles the three baskets into ﬁnal consumption
in two steps. First, they bundle export and the import baskets into the traded-goods basket






















This assumption is motivated by the evidence that the elasticity of substitution of traded
goods is greater than one (Hummels, 2001; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Cost mini-























The expenditure share depends on terms of trade deﬁned as Ωt = Pt,H/Pt,F.
Next, the retailers bundle the traded and the non-traded baskets into ﬁnal consumption












sj, j ∈ (N,T) is the exogenous expenditure share and sN =1− sT. I assume a constant
expenditure share because Stockman and Tesar (1995) ﬁnd that the expenditure share of
12non-traded goods is quite stable at high frequency. The CPI is the geometric average of the






































The traded RER is the relative price of the traded-goods basket. Its ﬂuctuations depend
on the intratemporal substitution between export and import goods, which in turn depends
on terms of trade. Trade costs raise the ﬂuctuations of the traded-RER when θ  =1 . 5 The
non-traded RER is the relative, relative price of non-traded to traded goods.
3.3 Variance decomposition
Deﬁne the sector-level productivity such that the aggregate output is a monotonically in-












For simplicity, assume that a (z) = 1. Substitute equilibrium prices into (8) and (9) and
log-linearize them around the steady state. Let ˆ x be percentage deviation of xt from its




t )/(1 − zh
t + zl
t). Deﬁne the steady-
state home bias in traded-goods consumption as hbss = sss,H/sss,F, and the parameter



























,w h e r esi is given. Assume
symmetric preferences. Then Qt,T =( 1− τ)(sF −sH)/sT.
6See the appendix.
13ξ = hbss/(1 + hbss)2[(1 − τ)1−θ − (1 − τ)θ−1] > 0. Then,
ˆ Ωt =ˆ ωt − ˆ χt − ˆ At,H, (10)
  Qt,T = −ξ  Ωt +
ξ
θ − 1
  Zt, (11)
  Qt,N = sN(   At,N −   At,H) − sN
 






ξ is the elasticity of traded RER appreciation with respect to the terms of trade. It plays a
role in transmitting shocks from the terms of trade and the composition of trade to the two
RERs. The correlation between the two RERs in (11) and (12) is
ρTN =
sNξ(1 − ξ)σ2(  Ωt)
σ(  Qt,T)σ(  Qt,N)
−
sNξσ(   At,N −   At,H,   Ωt)





σ(  Ωt,   Zt)+ξσ2(  Zt)/(θ − 1) − σ(   At,N −   At,H,   Zt)
σ(  Qt,T)σ(  Qt,N)
 
. (13)
ρTN is governed by the terms of trade in the ﬁrst term, and the composition of trade in the
remaining terms. It has important implications for the variance decomposition.
Proposition 1.If ˆ zt,l =ˆ zt,h =0 ,t h e n|ρTN| =1 .7
Proposition 1 states that the two RERs are perfectly correlated when trade patterns
are exogenous. The perfect correlation is intuitive, since terms of trade is the only variable
transmitting shocks to both RERs in the absence of ﬁrm transitions in and out of exporting.
On the other hand, when exporting decision is endogenous, the transition is the other channel
for shock transmissions and breaks the perfect correlation.
Proposition 2.If ˆ zt,l =ˆ zt,h =0 ,t h e nvN = sN(1−ξ)/(ξ+sN(1−ξ)) and ∂vN/∂hbss < 0.8
7Proof:I fˆ zt,l =ˆ zt,h =0 ,t h e n ˆ Zt =0a n d ˆ At,i = 0. Substitute these into (11) and (12) and (13). Then
ρTN =1i fξ<1a n dρTN = −1i fξ>1. Q.E.D.
8Proof: From the proof of Proposition 1, if ˆ zt,l =ˆ zt,h =0 ,t h e nρTN =1i fξ<1a n dρTN = −1i fξ>1.
Substituting these together with (11) and (12) into (1) gives vN.T h e n∂vN/∂hbss =( ∂vN/∂ξ)(∂ξ/∂hbss)=
−sN[(1 − τ)1−θ − (1 − τ)θ−1](1 − hbss)2/[(1 + hbss)4(ξ + sN(1 − ξ))2]. Since sN > 0a n dτ>0, then
∂vN/∂hbss < 0. Q.E.D.
14Proposition 2 states that when trade patterns are exogenous, the contribution of the
non-traded RER is independent of transition dynamics and decreasing in the steady-state
home bias in traded-goods consumption. A rise in home-bias increases the substitution
eﬀect among traded goods and raises importance of the traded RER. Propositions 1 and 2
are related. When the two RERs are perfectly correlated, shocks inﬂuence their variance
without changing their relative importance. Proposition 2 highlights the role of endogenous
tradability as the channel for transition dynamics to aﬀect the variance decomposition.
We can derive the contribution of the non-traded RER for general cases from (11), (12)





Proposition 3.If ξ<1,t h e n∂vN/∂σ(   At,N −   At,H,   Ωt) < 0,a n dv i c ev e r s a . 9
Proposition 3 predicts that the contribution of the non-traded RER is decreasing in the
covariance between terms of trade and productivity diﬀerentials in the non-traded and export
sectors, when the terms of trade elasticity of traded RER appreciation is less than 1. The
specialization pattern in (4) and (5) provides an intuition. A rise in terms of trade drives
some low-productivity producers to quit exporting and thus creates productivity variations
which absorb the eﬀect of terms of trade on price. The covariance then measures the degree
9Proof: (11) and (12) and (13) imply that:




(θ − 1)2 σ
2(  Zt) −
sNξ(1 − ξ)+ξ2
θ − 1
σ(  Ωt,   Zt)+
sNξ
θ − 1
σ(   At,N −   At,H,   Zt),
ΣN = sN(1 − ξ)(sN(1 − ξ)+ξ)σ2(  Ωt)+
sN(1 + sN)ξ2
(θ − 1)2 σ2(  Z) −
3sNξ(1 − ξ)
θ − 1




σ(   At,N −   At,H,   Zt) − (2(1 − ξ)s2
N + ξsN)σ(   At,N −   At,H,   Ωt).
Then ∂vN/σ(   At,N −   At,H,   Ωt)=−2((1 − ξ)s2
N + ξsN)(1 − ˜ vN)/(ΣN +Σ T). Note that sN > 0, Σj > 0, and
vN > 0. If ξ<1, then (1 − ξ)s2
N + ξsN > 0, and vice versa. Q.E.D.
15of asymmetry in price variations across sectors. Proposition 3 has an implication for the
stylized facts presented in the previous section. Speciﬁcally, the facts will be consistent with
my model if exchange rate ﬂexibility raises (reduces) the covariance when the terms of trade
elasticity of traded RER appreciation is smaller (greater) than 1.
3.4 Sticky wages
I introduce sticky wages in order to model exchange rate. Following the open-economy macro
models such as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000a), I assume monopolistically-competitive labor
market. Households are diﬀerentiated by the superscript k, k ∈ [0,1]. The set of home
residents is [0,α],α ∈ (0,1), and that of foreign residents is (α,1]. I describe the home
residents’ optimization problem, and that in the foreign economy is the mirror image.
The household k chooses wages W k
t , ﬁnal consumption Ck
t and money balance Mk
t .H e r
labor supply lk


































0 <β<1, µ<1, σc > 0,  >0. χm > 0, and χl > 0.
She can accumulate wealth by holding Mk
t or a one-period international bond F k
t .T h e
bond is denominated in the home currency and pays interest rate it. I assume that it is
costly to adjust the bond holding, to prevent the bond holding from becoming inﬁnitely
large. Otherwise I cannot solve the model using log-linearization (Turnovsky, 1985). The
portfolio adjustment cost is quadratic in deviations from the steady-state bond holdings,




t /Pt)2,a n dφ>0.
The other critical assumption is that adjusting wages is also costly. The cost is analogous
to the price-adjustment cost in Rotemberg (1982) and essential for generating sluggish wage









t = W k
t /W k
t−1 and φw > 0. The other source of household
income is government transfer T k
t . Let ∆ denote the ﬁrst diﬀerence. The budget constraint
requires that asset accumulation ∆Mk
t +∆ F k
























The aggregate labor supply is a CES index with elasticity η, Lt =
 
















and labor demand fac-
















t=0 to maximize (15)








taking as given the process of price {Pt}∞



























































Technically, we need a foreign-currency bond to discuss foreign interest rate i 
t.I t i s
issued by the foreign government and available to only foreign residents. The bond stock is


































173.5 Exchange rate regime
Exchange rate stability may arise even when a ﬂexible exchange rate regime is adopted.
However, the stylized facts presented by Mendoza (2000), Burstein et al. (2005) and Figure
1 strongly suggest the role of exchange rate regimes. For this reason, I postulate exchange
rate variability as an outcome of exchange rate regime characterized by the domestic interest
rule. Under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the home central bank adopts the following rule.
ˆ it =ˆ i
 
t + λs ˆ St + λff
 
t , (22)
where λs =1a n dλf = φ(1 + ss)/iss. ˆ St is deviation from the target exchange rate and
f 
t = F  
t /StP  
t . Endogenously (21) and (22) result in ˆ St = 0. Apart from the debt term,
the rule is similar to that in Benigno (2004) and Monacelli (2004). The debt enters the
rule because of the technical assumption that it cannot explode. Whether it is empirically
relevant has not been investigated.




z∈Zt,H∪Zt,N pt(z)yt(z)dz.L e t
πt be the inﬂation rate. The following rule is adopted under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
ˆ it = λiˆ it−1 +( 1− λi)
 
λπEtˆ πt+1 + λy ˆ Yt
 
. (23)
I assume away shocks on the domestic interest rate rules, to control the source of shocks, so
that a comparison of the eﬀect of shocks across regimes is meaningful.
The foreign central bank adopts the same rule independent of exchange rate regime. I
assume the rule adopted by Chari et al. (2002).
ˆ i
 
t = λiˆ i
 





















t is normally distributed by N(0,σ 2
















where ut and u 
t are jointly normally distributed by N(0,Σu).
Since my focus is on exchange rate policy, I assume a simple ﬁscal policy that rebates
seigniorage revenues to households, Tt =( Mt−Mt−1)P
−1
t . All markets clear in equilibrium.10
I quantitatively evaluate the model using calibration exercise in the next section.
4 Calibration
4.1 Parametrization
Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter values. The most important ones concern the
relative productivity schedule. Some studies have estimated productivities or relative pro-
ductivities of manufacturing sectors (Harrigan, 1999; Yi, 2003; and Eaton and Kortum,
2002). However, specifying the schedule requires knowledge of variations, not levels, of pro-
ductivity or variations of the set of export goods. Hummels and Klenow (2005) estimate
that the long-run elasticity of the relative range of export goods with respect to relative per-
capita income is 0.85. The elasticity can be driven by various factors besides comparative
advantage. I assume that in the steady state Ass(z)=ne−γz and set n and γ so that the
10See the appendix for the market clearing conditions.
19elasticity is less than 0.85. Its baseline value is 0.69. The entry-cost parameter is set to 9,
so that the short-run elasticity is substantially lower than its long-run level. The short-run
elasticity is 0.02 under ﬂexible and less than 0.01 under ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
Except for the productivity structure, all parameters are symmetric. Hummels (2001)
estimates that the freight rate varies between 4 and 13 percent of shipment value. I choose
0.15 to reﬂect other trade barriers such as tariﬀs and quotas. The expenditure share of
non-traded goods is 0.5 and in line with Falvey and Gemmell (1995). The intratemporal
elasticity of substitution varies from 5 to 10 in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). I use 3
because the classiﬁcation of goods in my model is quite broad.
The remaining parameters follow the business cycle literature, such as Mendoza (1999),
Huang and Liu (2002) and Chari et al. (2002). The wage-adjustment parameter is chosen
so that the labor contract period is 4 quarters. The interest rate rule follows Clarida et
al. (2000). Standard deviation of shocks are set so that the foreign output has the same
standard deviation as the Baxter-King-ﬁltered series of the U.S. output. In the steady state,
the aggregate allocation is symmetric. The home country exports 24 percent of goods, and
imports 43 percent of goods. The trade-to-GDP ratio is 42 percent and close to that of the
U.K. The terms of trade elasticity of traded RER appreciation is 0.16.
4.2 Baseline results
I simulate the log-linearized version of the model with the foreign interest rate shocks for 100
periods for 50 times and report the summary statistics in Table 2. The statistics are average
of all simulations and statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 1-percent level. The ﬁrst two
columns correspond to ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, and the last one indicates
their diﬀerence. I display the corresponding statistics from Section 2 as a comparison.
20The ﬁrst block reports the contribution of the non-traded RER. It is 64 percent under
a ﬂexible and 95 percent under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. The model matches the 31-
percent diﬀerence reported in Section 2, although it overpredicts the level.
The second block summarizes volatility of key variables, which are RER, traded RER,
non-traded RER, terms of trade, and the ratio of trade balance to GDP. The volatility is
measured as the standard deviation relative to output. Consistent with Mussa (1986) and
Baxter and Stockman (1989), exchange rate ﬂexibility raises the volatility of RER. In line
with the exchange rage disconnect puzzle in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000b), the RER volatility
under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime is more than 5 times of output volatility, as in the data.
The model underpredicts volatility of all variables except for the non-traded RER and the
ratio of trade balance to GDP under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
In the third block, consistent with Proposition 1, the correlation between traded and non-
traded RERs is not perfect. Exchange rate stability reduces the correlation from 0.66 to -0.67.
It is not meaningful to compare these numbers with those in my dataset, which are negative
by construction. The study using disaggregated price series by Mendoza (2000) provides a
usual comparison. The corresponding numbers in his study is 0.28 and -0.70, respectively.
The model matches the sign and closely matches the magnitude under a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime. According to (13), the correlation is positively inﬂuenced by the volatility of terms
of trade, which is reduced by exchange rate stability. That is why exchange rate stability
reduces the correlation and turns it to a negative value.
The next block conﬁrms Proposition 3, given that the terms of trade elasticity of traded
RER appreciation is below 1. Exchange rate stability reduces the covariance between terms
of trade and productivity diﬀerentials from 0.06 to -0.15. To gain an intuition, I rewrite the
21covariance using (10):
σ(   At,N −   At,H,   Ωt)=σ(   At,N −   At,H,   ωt) − σ(   At,N −   At,H,   At,H) − σ(   At,N −   At,H,   χt). (28)
The last term in (28) is zero given nominal shocks, so the covariance measures the diﬀerence
between two covariances: that between productivity diﬀerentials and relative wage and that
between productivity diﬀerentials and export-sector productivity. Both covariances are pos-
itive for the following reason. A rise in relative wage causes some home exporters to quit and
some foreign ﬁrms to begin exporting. The quitting ﬁrms have lower productivity than the
remaining ones, hence their exits raise the export-sector productivity. Their exits also raise
the productivity in the non-traded sector in which producers are less productive. The new
foreign exporters further raise the productivity of the non-traded sector by replacing low-
productivity industries at home. Overall, a rise in relative wage raises both the export-sector
productivity and productivity diﬀerentials between the non-traded and export sectors. 11
Exchange rate ﬂexibility raises volatility of relative wage and thus the covariance between
terms of trade and productivity diﬀerentials. Shocks are transmitted more to prices in the
export sector than those in the non-traded sector, as dynamics of comparative advantage
amplify the expenditure switching between import and export goods. Fixing exchange rate
reduces the eﬀect and increases the substitution between non-traded and traded goods.
For the persistence of RER, the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of RER under ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes is 0.31. It is close to Chari et al.’s (2002) prediction of 0.4, but far below 0.71
11By the deﬁnition of covariance, we write the ﬁrst two covariances in (28) as follows.
σ(   At,N −   At,H,   ωt)=σ(  ωt)[σ(   At,N)ρ(   At,N,   ωt) − σ(   At,H)ρ(   At,H,   ωt)]
σ(   At,N −   At,H,   At,H)=σ(   At,H)[σ(   At,N)ρ(   At,N,   At,H) − σ(   At,H)]
Equations (4) and (5) imply that ρ(ˆ zl
t,   ωt) < 0a n dρ(ˆ zh
t ,   ωt) < 0. Since A 
t(z) < 0, then ρ(   At,N,   ωt) >
ρ(   At,H,   ωt) > 0a n dρ(   At,N,   At,H) = 1. From the deﬁnitions of At,H and At,N, σ(   At,N) >σ (   At,H). Substi-
tuting these inequalities into the above expressions gives σ(   At,N−   At,H,   ωt) > 0a n dσ(   At,N−   At,H,   At,H) > 0.
22in the data. The model overpredicts persistence under ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
To summarize, the model correctly predicts the sign of diﬀerences in summary statistics
across exchange rate regimes, except for the persistence of RER. It successfully predicts the
magnitude of diﬀerences across regimes in the contribution of the non-traded RER. Moreover,
it matches the sign of correlation between traded and non-traded RERs.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
This section compares the baseline model with the model of exogenous tradability in which
trade pattern is given by the baseline steady state. I report the summary statistics in Table
3. They are in boldface letters when the diﬀerence across regimes is signiﬁcant at the 1-
percent level. I also explore the role of other dynamic properties: TFP shocks, a reduction
of the wage adjustment parameter to 25 percent of its baseline value, and a reduction of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution by 25 percent.
Table 3 summarizes ﬁve results. First, when the trade pattern is exogenous, the type
of shocks and the exchange rate regime are irrelevant to the variance decomposition, as
predicted by Proposition 2. In this case, the traded and non-traded RERs are perfectly
correlated, as predicted by Proposition 1. However, Engel (1999) and Mendoza (2000) ﬁnd
that the correlation in the data is not perfect. Hence, endogenous tradability is essential
for generating the observed correlation. Moreover, the sign of correlation under each regime
always matches with that in Mendoza (2000) when the trade pattern is endogenous.
Second, as predicted by Proposition 3, the contribution of the non-traded RER is decreas-
ing in the covariance between terms of trade and productivity diﬀerentials. The diﬀerence
in the covariance across regimes measures the expenditure switching eﬀect of exchange rate
generated by endogenous tradability, since it is zero when the trade pattern is exogenous.
23Third, the traded RER dominates the non-traded RER in response to TFP shocks, re-
gardless of exchange rate regime. From the trade pattern in (4) and (5), favorable TFP
shocks have the opposite eﬀects on productivity from relative wage inﬂation, because they
encourage low-productivity ﬁrms to export. Hence, they reduce productivity and produc-
tivity diﬀerentials together with terms of trade. Consequently, TFP shocks create positive
covariations between productivity diﬀerentials and terms of trade.12 The covariance is sta-
tistically the same across regimes, meaning that the expenditure switching eﬀect of exchange
rate generated by endogenous tradability is small. Consistent with Betts and Kehoe (2001b),
Bergin and Glick (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005), my model suggests that TFP shocks
could be a reason why the relative price of traded goods drives the U.S. RERs in Engel (1999).
Fourth, a reduction of the wage adjustment parameter or the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in the presence of endogenous tradability further increases the contribution of
the non-traded RER under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. The reduction strengthens the
expenditure switching through the intratemporal channel. Thus, the reduction raises the
covariance between terms of trade and productivity diﬀerentials under a ﬂexible but reduces
it under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
Finally, the assumption of endogenous tradability has a stabilization eﬀect which reduces
the volatility of RER and terms of trade by raising trade responses. However, the increase in
the volatility of trade-balance-to-GDP ratio is not extreme and below 20 percent regardless
of the type of shocks.
12By the deﬁnition of covariance,
σ(   At,N −   At,H,   χt)=σ(  χt)[σ(   At,N)ρ(   At,N,   χt) − σ(   At,H)ρ(   At,H,   χt)]
Equations (4) and (5) imply that ρ(   At,N,   χt) < 0a n dρ(   At,H,   χt) < 0. Since A 
t(z) < 0, then ρ(   At,N,   χt) <
ρ(   At,H,   χt) < 0. From the deﬁnitions of At,H and At,N, σ(   At,N) >σ (   At,H). Substituting these inequalities
into the above expression gives σ(   At,N −   At,H,   χt) < 0.
24Conceptually, the expenditure switching eﬀect of exchange rate may not be increasing
in the intratemporal substitution elasticity, since a high value may reduce price variations
while raising quantity responses. To illustrate this point, I vary the elasticity θ from 1.5 to
5 and compute the expenditure switching eﬀect of exchange rates generated by endogenous
tradability. Figure 4 plots the eﬀect and the diﬀerence between the contribution of the
non-traded RER under ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rate regimes against the elasticity.
In Figure 4, the expenditure switching eﬀect is increasing in θ for θ ∈ [1.5,2.5), but
decreasing for θ ∈ (2.5,5]. The non-monotonicity is in contrast with the monotonicity of the
corresponding relationship in Monacelli (2004). His measure of the expenditure switching
eﬀect is the ratio of RER volatility under ﬂexible and ﬁxed regimes. However, even when
I use the same measure, my model continues to predict the non-monotonicity. The main
diﬀerence between our models is that he abstracts from non-traded goods. The existence of
non-traded goods in my model produces a monotonic relationship between the expenditure
switching eﬀect and the diﬀerence in the variance decomposition across regimes, not the
substitution elasticity. The exchange rate regime has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the variance
decomposition even when the substitution elasticity is as low as 1.5, which is often used in
the business cycle literature such as Backus et al. (1994). With this value, exchange rate
stability raises the contribution of the non-traded RER by 22 percent.
5 Concluding remarks
The model shows that the ﬁrm transitions in and out of exporting can amplify the expen-
diture switching eﬀect of exchange rates in response to nominal shocks. The eﬀect can be
so large that its removal raises importance of ﬂuctuations in the relative, relative price of
non-traded to traded goods, as reported in the data. The insights in my model have three
25implications for open-economy macroeconomics. First, the assumption that the relative price
of non-traded to traded goods drives RER, as in Calvo (1986), is useful for studying stabi-
lization policy when shocks are predominantly nominal. However, deviations from the law
of one price for traded goods are necessary for studying the eﬀects of real shocks.
The second implication is related to the theoretical literature on trade and business cy-
cles. Proposition 1 suggests that the correlation between traded and non-traded RERs in
those models is perfect and contradicts the ﬁndings in Engel (1999) and Mendoza (2000).
The imperfect correlation between the traded and non-traded RERs in my model implies
imperfect correlation between relative traded consumption and relative non-traded consump-
tion. Hence, my model could be useful for solving some puzzles related to trade and business
cycles such as the consumption correlation puzzle in Backus and Smith (1993).
The ﬁnal implication is related to the theory of optimum currency area. The theory
views similarity of economic structure as a condition for forming a currency union, since
that implies high cross-country correlation of real shocks. However, my model suggests that
diﬀerent specialization pattern has a stabilization eﬀect which reduces the cost of losing
monetary independence. We can extend the model to include capital to discuss the impact
of exchange rate regimes on economic growth. I leave these extensions for future work.
26A Appendix
A.1 Sample countries
Datasets 1 and 3: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark,
Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, U.K., U.S., Venezuela.
Datasets 2 and 4: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Singa-
pore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, U.K. and U.S.
A.2 Aggregate Productivity and output
We can write the aggregate output in each sector i ∈ (H,N) as a monotonic and increasing
function of the eﬀective unit of labor input deﬁned as the product of TFP, the aggregate
productivity and the aggregate labor input. First, deﬁne the aggregate output as Yt,i =
Pt
−1 




Substitute the equilibrium prices and the deﬁnition of the aggregate productivity into the










The constant-returns-to-scale technology implies the following zero-proﬁt condition:
PtYt,i − Wtlt,i =0 . (A.3)










The product At,ilt,i is the eﬀective labor input in the sector i.
A.3 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions for goods markets and labor market in the home country are
given by the following:
Yt,N = αCt,N, (A.5)
Yt,H = αCt,H +( 1− α)C
 
t,H/(1 − τ), (A.6)
Lt = lt,H + lt,N. (A.7)
Similar conditions hold in the foreign country.














. The budget constraint, the govern-
ment budget constraint and the zero-proﬁt conditions give the current account dynamics.
∆Ft = TB tPt + itFt−1 − Φ(Ft/Pt)Pt (A.8)
Finally, the bond market clears.
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Notes: Letters are ﬁrst initials of country name. The numbers index the dataset: 1 uses
market exchange rate and PPI; 2 uses market exchange rate and UV index; 3 uses oﬃcial
exchange rate and PPI; and 4 uses oﬃcial exchange rate and UV index.Figure 2: Contribution of non-traded RER and volatility of market exchange rates






































A. Producer price index









































B. Geometric mean of import and export unit valuesFigure 3: Contribution of non-traded RER and volatility of oﬃcial exchange rates





































A. Producer price index







































B. Geometric mean of import and export unit valuesFigure 4: Expenditure switching eﬀect of exchange rates and elasticity of substitution
















Cov(terms of trade, productivity differentials | flexible) 
− Cov(terms of trade, productivity differentials | fixed)
Note: vN denotes the contribution of the non-traded RER.Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
Parameters Value
International Trade
Country size α =0 .5
Relative productivity n =1 .5,γ=1
Entry-cost parameter φa =9
Trade costs τ =0 .15
Households
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution θ =3
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc =0 .2
Discount factor β =0 .99
Elasticity of labor supply µ =1− 1/σc
Interest semi-elasticity of money demand 1/  =0 .39
Portfolio adjustment cost φ =0 .00074
Elasticity of substitution of labor η =2
Wage adjustment cost φw =5 .8935
Monetary policy
Steady-state inﬂation πss = π 
ss =1 .03581/4
Interest rate rule λi =0 .79, λπ =2 .15, λy =0 .93
Interest rate shock
Persistence ρv =0
Volatility σv =0 .02
Productivity shock
Persistence ρx =0 .95
Spillover ρ 
x =0
Volatility σu = σu  =0 .01,
σu,u  =( 0 .25)0.012Table 2: Baseline calibration
Flexible Fixed Flexible - Fixed
Contribution of non-traded RER
Model 0.64 0.95 -0.31
Data 0.19 0.50 -0.31
Standard deviation
RER
Model 5.19 0.11 5.08
Data 5.87 2.66 3.21
Traded RER
Model 2.15 0.11 2.05
Data 5.95 2.61 3.34
Non-traded RER
Model 3.52 0.15 3.37
Data 2.66 1.95 0.71
Terms of trade
Model 5.68 0.12 5.56
Data 6.83 2.53 4.30
Trade balance to GDP
Model 3.63 0.17 3.46
Data 2.05 0.59 1.46
Correlation of traded
and non-traded RERs
Model 0.66 -0.67 1.33
Data (Mendoza, 2000) 0.28 -0.70 0.98
Covariance of terms of trade
and productivity diﬀerentials
Model 0.06 -0.15 0.21
Persistence of RER
Model 0.31 0.84 -0.53
Data 0.71 0.65 0.06
Notes: The statistics are averages of 50 simulations and statistically diﬀerent from zero
at the 1-percent level. Covariance between terms of trade and productivity diﬀerentials is
measured relative to variance of terms of trade. Standard deviation is measured relative to
that of output.Table 3: Endogenous tradability vs. exogenous tradability
Endogenous Exogenous
Flexible Fixed Flexible Fixed
Contribution of non-traded RER
Baseline 0.64 0.95 0.72 0.72
TFP shocks 0.43 0.47 0.72 0.72
Low wage-rigidity 0.65 1.04 0.72 0.72
Low intertemporal elasticity 0.65 1.03 0.72 0.72
Correlation of the traded-
and non-traded RERs
Baseline 0.66 -0.67 1 1
TFP shocks 0.04 -0.04 1 1
Low wage-rigidity 0.73 -0.62 1 1
Low intertemporal elasticity 0.69 -0.64 1 1
Covariance of terms of trade
and productivity diﬀerentials
Baseline 0.06 -0.15 0 0
TFP shocks 0.21 0.18 0 0
Low wage-rigidity 0.06 -0.20 0 0
Low intertemporal elasticity 0.07 -0.21 0 0
Standard deviation of RER
Baseline 5.19 0.11 6.97 0.27
TFP shocks 2.22 1.94 4.53 3.85
Low wage-rigidity 5.17 0.22 6.66 0.43
Low intertemporal elasticity 5.02 0.18 6.62 0.43
Standard deviation of terms of trade
Baseline 5.68 0.12 7.62 0.29
TFP shocks 2.43 2.13 4.89 4.15
Low wage-rigidity 5.66 0.24 7.27 0.47
Low intertemporal elasticity 5.48 0.20 7.22 0.46
Standard deviation of trade-balance-
to-GDP ratio
Baseline 3.63 0.17 3.49 0.15
TFP shocks 2.36 2.23 2.18 1.86
Low wage-rigidity 3.46 0.27 3.34 0.25
Low intertemporal elasticity 3.45 0.25 3.35 0.25
Notes:
1. Boldface numbers indicate that the null that the statistics are the same across exchange
rate regimes is rejected at the 1-percent level.
2. Standard deviation is measured relative to that of output.